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language: syntax and semantics provide versatile formal tools that go beyond
the specificities of human linguistics. We argue that “formal monkey linguistics”
can yield new insights into monkey morphology, syntax, and semantics, as well
as raise provocative new questions about the existence of a pragmatic, competi-
tion-based component in these communication systems. Finally, we argue that
evolutionary questions, which are highly speculative in human language, can be
addressed in an empirically satisfying fashion in primate linguistics, and we lay
out problems that should be addressed at the interface between evolutionary
primate linguistics and formal analyses of language evolution.
Keywords: primate linguistics, primate semantics, primate syntax, evolutionary
primate linguistics, call evolution, evolution of language
1 Introduction
“Formal Monkey Linguistics” (Schlenker et al. 2016b) summarizes four types of
contributions to recent research on monkey calls. First, it states numerous
generalizations about the form and use of monkey sequences, in a unified format
that facilitates comparison. Second, it establishes general methods to study their
properties – and especially their meaning – in a formally precise fashion. Third,
it makes specific proposals about the division of labor between syntax, seman-
tics and pragmatics within each species of interest. Fourth, it proposes to add a
comparative and evolutionary component to the enterprise, and sketches a
reconstruction of call evolution over millions of years in some simple but
striking cases. The approach is both formally precise and data-driven, hence
the importance of a collaboration between linguists and primatologists.
In the rest of this note, we remind the reader of the basic goals of a formal
monkey syntax, semantics and pragmatics; they should be uncontroversial if
certain confusions and misunderstandings are set aside. We then lay out sub-
stantive topics of discussion in the areas of morphology and syntax, semantics,
pragmatics, and monkey call evolution.
2 Methodological preliminaries
2.1 The formal approach
Observations and field experiments have established two general points:
1. The species under study arrange discrete calls in constrained ways.
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2. There is a systematic relation between calls and the natural or experimental
situations in which they occur. Furthermore, field experiments establish that
the monkeys themselves know this correlation and thus derive information
from the calls they hear.
Point 1 establishes that calls are subject to syntactic rules, i. e. rules that
specify how calls can be ordered. To study them precisely, one needs a formal
monkey syntax, which establishes a bipartition (or a more fine-grained classifica-
tion) of sequences into possible and impossible ones – or to use standard
terminology: well-formed and ill-formed ones.
Point 2 establishes that calls have a semantics, i. e. that they provide informa-
tion by being appropriate or inappropriate in various situations. To study precisely
the information conveyed by these calls, one needs a formal monkey semantics
that establishes a bipartition (or possibly a more fine grained classification) of
pairs of the form <situation, call sequence>, determining in the general cases
whether a call sequence is appropriate or inappropriate in a given situation – or
to use standard terminology: whether it is true or false in that situation.1
These points should be uncontroversial; to say that one needs a “formal
monkey syntax” or a “formal monkey semantics” is just another way of stating
that one wishes to develop a precise account of these properties (how these proper-
ties will be eventually derived is another matter, but the end product should be a
formal syntactic and semantic theory). While one might think that the precision is
overkill, a cursory look at the generalizations and analyses offered in “Formal
Monkey Linguistics” shows that this is not so. Although extant data are incompar-
ably simpler than what is found in human language, analysts must state general-
izations and theories with great precision if theywant their claims to be understood,
their predictions to be testable, and possible errors to be uncovered.
Once a syntax and semantics have been established, a standard question
arises about the division of labor between them: a sequence may fail to be
produced because it is syntactically ill-formed; or because its meaning is a
useless one. The category “syntactically ill-formed” must itself be refined:
there could be cases of articulatory/phonetic impossibility, and others that are
1 Formal language theory in the narrow (and standard) sense concerns the syntactic side of the
problem, and helps define a class of strings which then serve as the input to interpretation, as
studied by formal semantics. It is thus a category mistake to use (only) tools of formal language
theory to study semantic phenomena. For this reason, we cannot quite make sense of the
following remark by Fitch 2016: “A formal framework that makes fewer assumptions about
meaning (e. g. formal language theory, especially in its sub-regular ‘phonological’ subset) is
then the more appropriate starting point for formal analyses of animal communication.”
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syntactic in a narrow (cognitive) sense. As for the semantic side, it is bound to
interact with knowledge of the environment (what is often called “world knowl-
edge” in linguistics): a signal that has rich behavioral consequences may encode
a highly specific message, or a far less specific one that happens to interact with
general knowledge on the part of the hearers.
While these distinctions are close to conceptual necessities, “Formal
Monkey Linguistics” makes the controversial claim that monkey sequences can
best be analyzed if one posits rules of competition among calls, notably an
“Informativity Principle” that favors more informative calls – hence a third
general point made in our contribution:
3. There are rules of call competition – notably, if a situation licenses a more
specific call or call sequence, and a less specific one, the more specific one
must be chosen (“Informativity Principle”).
If this proposal is correct, formal monkey linguistics must in the end have a
pragmatic component; and thus the enterprise will be to investigate the division of
labor between syntax (broadly construed), semantics, pragmatics and world
knowledge.
The strength of the formal approach is to turn these general issues into precise
ones, and to develop the program within a framework that uses versatile formal
tools, which need not be borrowed from human linguistics, but may facilitate the
comparison among various communication systems, including human language
(as is emphasized in “Formal Monkey Linguistics”, for the most part the properties
we analyze are very different from those found in human languages2).
2.2 Clarifications
If formal precision matters, conceptual clarity does too.
One may object to the program of a formal monkey syntax on the ground
that monkey inventories and sequence types appear to be finite, unlike human
2 Berwick writes that “one might go astray by analyzing monkey language as though it were a
human language (or even a computer language), and this is the key cautionary note of this
commentary that must be sounded in programmatic approaches like Schlenker et al.”: Given the
numerous differences we have noted between human and monkey languages, it is hard to see in
what sense our proposal analyzes monkey language as though it were a human language. Nor
do we know of computer languages with similar properties. Instead, we propose to apply the
same formal rigor to the study of these communication systems as to human language. The
initial analogies end there (and for us it is thus trivially true that, as Berwick writes, “no human-
type grammar needs to be invoked at all”; in fact, we never invoked one in the first place).
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sentences (Berwick 2016). This is in a certain sense true, but doesn’t detract from
the general program.3 Standard criteria of empirical adequacy and theoretical
parsimony apply for finite systems – as is well-known within human linguistics
itself (morphological paradigms are finite but still give rise to interesting theo-
retical proposals and debates). Finiteness in syntax means that great care must
be exercised when trying to determine whether a form is the product of a rule, or
is memorized. The issue arose for instance in our discussion of Putty-nosed
pyow-hack sequences, which appear to be associated with a special meaning
(involving group movement), not straightforwardly derivable from the meaning
of their component parts. Syntactically, pyow-hack sequences come in all sorts
of forms, as long as a few pyows are followed by a few hacks; and their time
course is relatively slow. This makes it implausible that all these forms are
memorized as fixed sequences. On the other hand, it could be that a general
pattern of the form P+H+ is memorized. More elaborate methods should of
course be developed to try to decide between rules and memorized forms. (On
the semantic side, finiteness doesn’t arise in the same way, since a single well-
formed sequence can be associated to infinitely many situations in which it may
be true or false.)
The program of an animal syntax in general is now relatively standard, and
our claims about monkey syntax are particularly modest, as we will see below.
While the program of an animal semantics follows with the same strength when
it is established that sequences convey information, the tools we employ may
lead to various misunderstandings that should be set aside. They pertain both to
what semantics in general is, and to what formal monkey semantics in particular
intends to be.
(i) The linguistics of the 1970’s may give the impression that formal seman-
tics is used in logic and philosophy, rather than in linguistics.4 The
3 Schlenker et al. 2016b in effect suggested that it would be interesting to establish what is the
least powerful way to characterize the syntax of monkey languages, concluding:
On a substantive level, our syntactic generalizations were modest and could be handled
with very simple finite state grammars. It would be interesting to explore in future research
(i) whether all monkey languages can indeed be described in such simple terms, especially
when larger databases are considered, and (ii) if so, which subset of finite state grammars
best characterizes the syntax of these languages (see for instance Pullum and Rogers 2006
and Rogers and Pullum 2011).
4 Fitch 2016 thus writes that “several of the fundamental theoretical assumptions of formal
semantics and pragmatics... ultimately stem more from logic and philosophy than from linguis-
tics per se”. This is a surprising claim in view of the rather uncontroversial empirical achieve-
ments of contemporary semantics, which offers a detailed understanding of subtle empirical
facts, based both on rich introspective judgments and on experimental data.
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developments of the last 40 years have shown how wrong-headed this
impression is. The synthesis from the 1980’s treated natural languages
as formal languages both from a syntactic and from a semantic perspec-
tive. In both areas the goal was to gain insights into the workings of the
human mind: syntactic and semantic theories alike seek to posit
mechanisms that are both descriptively adequate and cognitive plausi-
ble. The developments might have been slower to come in semantics,
but they are so prevalent and dynamic that they are hard to miss (see for
instance Maienborn et al. 2011a, 2011b, 2012 for a recent overview of the
field).
(ii) One may also have the impression that formal monkey semantics comes
with numerous concepts borrowed from human language, such as those of
predication and reference. As we defined the project above, and as is made
very explicit in “Formal Monkey Linguistics”, this just isn’t the case. In fact,
not a single one of the analyses we offer posits predicates or referential
expressions – all are propositional in nature (with the exception of the
Campbell’s suffix -oo, which is a propositional modifier).5 Nor should this
be particularly surprising: the formal semantics that one gives for proposi-
tional logic is equally devoid of predicates and referential expressions; and
within human linguistics, weather verbs such as occur in It’s snowing or It’s
raining are arguably 0-place predicates, i. e. propositions. A related confu-
sion might arise if one ignores what semantics – including human seman-
tics – can in principle do, taking elementary introductions to be fully
representative of the field, with their focus on information pertaining to
the external world rather than, say, to the emotional state of the speaker.
Here too, nothing in the framework prevents semantic information from
being conveyed about the emotional state of the speaker, as much con-
temporary linguistic research makes abundantly clear. (See, for example,
research on expressives (Potts 2005, among others): using frog to refer to
French people or Boche to refer to German people comes with a clear
emotional or subjective component.)
(iii) A different case of confusion pertains to the innate character of many
primate calls. One may think that innateness gets in the way of a formal
analysis. There is no reason for this. Even within human linguistics,
semanticists routinely provide lexical entries for features that are often
5 As a result, the following comment by Fitch 2016 has no relevance: “the very notion of
‘reference’ is heavily laden with assumptions that are questionable even for human language,
inapplicable to other human communicative systems (e. g. music or laughter), and inappropri-
ate for primate communication.”
178 Philippe Schlenker et al.
Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/11/16 9:27 AM
thought to be part of an innate inventory, such as the category “plural”.
There is certainly nothing in the innate or non-innate character of an
expression that impinges on the existence of a lexical entry for it; in the
first case, the entry won’t have to be learned.6
(iv) These considerations suggest that as soon as a formal system conveys
information, there can be a semantic approach to it. In fact, formal
semanticists have even extended their approach to laughter (Ginzburg
et al. 2015) and to music (Schlenker 2016) – sometimes with entirely
different tools from the ones that are used for the semantics of human
languages, or of primate languages, for that matter. The resulting pro-
posals might be true or false, insightful or not. But the advantage of
asking such questions is to obtain a much richer typology of meaning
phenomena in nature, and in particular to come to a comparison
between very different means of transmitting information.
(v) One could conclude from these remarks that formal semantics is so
general as to be vacuous. But this confuses a framework with particular
theories that can be stated within it. The situation in semantics is thus
parallel to the one we find in syntax: formal language theory offers a
general framework in which to state theories pertaining to very diverse
communication systems. Similarly, formal semantics offers a versatile
framework to analyze their informational content. The difference between
the two cases is primarily one of familiarity, due to the fact that formal
syntax took off in the 1960’s, whereas formal semantics was only inte-
grated into mainstream linguistics in the 1980’s. But certainly if ethology
is willing to have intimate contact with formal language theory (Fitch
2016), it should soon be sufficiently aufgeklärt to extend its horizons to
formal semantics.
The upshot is that the framework, if properly understood, should be relatively
uncontroversial. The discussion should thus be focused on the particular the-
ories we develop within this framework – which requires attention to the
relevant data and predictions. General objections are unlikely to be fruitful
unless they come with precise alternative analyses.
6 The following remark by Fitch 2016, while correct, has thus no bearing on the project of a
formal monkey semantics: “Starting with what we know about nonhuman primate (...) vocal
communication, there are several well-known differences from human spoken language that
argue against congruency. The most obvious is that primate calls have a strong innate
component...”.
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3 Morphology and syntax
3.1 Main findings
While “Formal Monkey Linguistics” puts greater emphasis on meaning than on
syntax, the following conclusions were reached:
(i) There are limited cases that argue for a kind of morphological composition
within calls. Notably, in Campbell’s monkeys the suffix -oo can be added
to two roots, krak and hok (see Ouattara et al. 2009a; Kuhn et al. 2014 for
recent discussion); and it is plausible that it modifies the meaning of the
root in the same way in both cases (on one theory, R-oo indicates that one
should be in the same attentional state as if R had been uttered – hence a
broader meaning; on a competing theory, R-oo indicates that there is a
weak threat of the type that licenses R – hence a narrower meaning). In
Diana monkeys, the A-call has root uses, but it also arguably serves to
form the complex calls LA, HA, and RA, which are targeted as units by the
operation of repetition, thus yielding LA LA LA LA (Veselinović et al. 2014;
Candiotti et al. 2012; see also Coye et al. 2016 for field experiments with
artificial playbacks, showing that the A suffix provides information about
caller identity while the first part of LA and RA complex calls provides
information about the social and physical context.7)
(ii) In other cases, there is no strong evidence against analyses that take
individual calls to form full-fledged, independent sentences, with a pro-
positional semantics. Two apparent exceptions pertain to pyow-hack
sequences in Putty-nosed monkeys, and to snort-roar sequences in Black-
and-White Colobus monkeys.
– In Putty-nosed monkeys, pyow seems to be used as a general alert call,
while hacks are often (but not only) used in eagle-related environ-
ments. Sequences made of a small number of pyows followed by a
small number of hacks were argued to trigger group movement, but
this function was not easy to derive on the basis of the individual
meaning of the calls, hence the possibility that these behave like
idioms in human language (e. g. kick the bucket), which are syntacti-
cally combinatorial but not semantically compositional. We offered an
7 In their words, “subjects’ responses suggest that the first unit (L or R) allows a receiver to
extract information about the social and physical environment, probably by associative learn-
ing, while the second unit (A) reveals the caller’s identity and may help the receiver to decide
how to react given their respective positions in the social network.”
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alternative analysis in which each call has a constant meaning, and
rules of pragmatic competition account for the “group movement”
function – a point to which we return below.
– In Black-and-White Colobus monkeys, sequences made of a single
snort immediately followed by roars seem to be used as highly under-
specified alert calls, unlike their component parts – notably snorts,
which are indicative of ground mammals when given singly. While the
data from field experiments are somewhat preliminary, this might
indicate that the snort-roar sequence must be treated as a unit rather
than semantically decomposed. But since (unlike the pyow-hack
sequence) the snort-roar sequence forms a tightly connected acoustic
unit, it might be that the complexity is phonological rather than
morphological or syntactic: on this view, it is a phonological accident
(without morphological or semantic consequences) that the snort-roar
sequence is made of snort followed by roars, just like in English irate
is phonologically made of syllables found in I and rate without
thereby being composed of these words
Overall, our findings are quite deflationary, but they raise two questions: one
pertains to the basic units of our analysis, usually sentences; the other pertains
to the typology of syntactic operations that one might expect to find in the
animal world.
3.2 What counts as a sentence?
The semantics we favored for all calls (except possibly Colobus snort and roars
found in snort-roar sequences) was propositional, each call counting as a
sentence. Sauerland 2016 proposes a definition of what should count as a
sentence, and notices that on this definition our calls are not used sententially.
(1) Sauerland’s definition of sentences (Sauerland 2016)
a. Syntax only applies within sentence units, but within those must apply.
b. Non-coordinating semantic composition can only occur within a
sentence.
As Sauerland correctly points out, we provide rules such as those in (2), which
violate (1b) (see Steinert-Threlkeld 2016 for related worries). For while the mean-
ing of the sequence wS is interpreted as the conjunction of the meaning of w and
the meaning of S, the parameter of evaluation is different in the two cases.
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(2) If w is any call and S is any sequence,
[[wS]] a = 1 iff [[w]] a = 1 and [[S]] a + 1 = 1.
Our rules were motivated by two goals.
(i) In some cases (in particular for Titi calls, but also in our preferred analysis
of Campbell’s calls), we wished to highlight that two calls of the same
sequence are still evaluated at different times, a point of some importance
when sequences are slow. In this case, we assumed for simplicity discrete
time, and thus that if a call w uttered at time a was followed by a call wʹ, wʹ
was uttered at time a+ 1. We gave rules such as (2a) in order to have an
explicit way of computing the truth conditions of entire discourses. But
nothing hinges on this (as is also emphasized in Schlenker et al., to appear):
we could have said just as well that each call is interpreted as a claim about
the time at which it is uttered; and that a discourse is true just in case each
of its individual calls is true – as evaluated at its time of utterance.
(ii) In some cases (in particular for Campbell’s calls, although the point is
more general), we also wished to find a simple way to state that repetitions
of calls were not vacuous, and thus we took each call to raise the value of
an all purpose alarm parameter. In such cases, a in (2) was interpreted as
an alarm parameter, not as a time parameter. (In our preferred analysis of
Campbell’s calls, we combined the two ideas, noting that a temporal
interpretation of the parameter still allows for an analysis in which the
longer the sequence is held, the greater the alarm level is.)
Concerning (ii), Sauerland is correct to point out that a more modular analysis
can be developed, one in which on his definition of a sentence each call counts as
a sentence and thus conjunctively modifies the meaning of the sequence it
belongs to. One can then compute the alarm level separately, by just counting
the number of calls. This would make the very same predictions as our system.
To illustrate, consider the “toy model” we used to introduce our explorations
(Schlenker et al. 2016b, (10a)).
(3) [[hok hok]] 0 = true
iff [[hok]] 0 = true and [[hok]] 1 = true,
iff there is an eagle and the alarm level is ≥ 0 and the alarm level is ≥ 1,
iff there is an eagle and the alarm level is ≥ 1.
The derivation proceeds by using a version of the rule in (2). We could instead
follow Sauerland and take the “simple” conjunction of hok and hok (without an
alarm parameter), to obtain truth conditions specifying that there is an eagle.
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One must then add a rule to the effect that a sequence containing n calls triggers
the inference that the alarm level is at least n–1. Sauerland’s own implementation
is slightly different, as it counts duration time rather than number of calls–see (4).
This, in turn, makes slightly different predictions from our system; but the point
remains correct that a more modular analysis can be given than ours.
(4) Sauerland’s Danger-Memory Proportionality:
The greater a threat, the longer an individual is alarmed by it.
Of course a key question is whether every individual call can be treated as a
separate sentence. We come close to this conclusion in Schlenker et al. 2016b,
but there are two recalcitrant cases: we do not treat the suffix -oo as a separate
sentence, but as a sentence modifier; and we hint at the possibility that Colobus
snort-roar sequences might have to be interpreted wholesale (the semantics of
Diana calls is not yet known in sufficient detail to bear on the propositional vs.
non-propositional nature of atomic calls). Sauerland 2016 asks exactly the right
question, namely how far one could go in taking them to be conjunctions of
sentences. We come back to this important point below.
3.3 Typology of animal syntax
It is standard, and illuminating, to use categories of formal language theory to
organize generalizations found in animal syntax, often with subclasses of finite
state languages (e. g. Berwick et al. 2011; Pullum and Rogers 2006; Rogers and
Pullum 2011). But Rizzi 2016 proposes a typology based on the kinds of “merge”
operations, i. e. operations of combination, that are found, as in (5) (see Murphy
2016 for further questions concerning the existence of labels in animal syntax).
(5) Rizzi’s typology (Rizzi 2016)
1-merge systems, or “word – word merge systems”: “merge can apply,
forming two-word expressions, but then the system stops, i.e., it lacks
recursive procedures.”
2-merge systems, “permitting word – word merge, and also word – phrase
merge.”
3-merge systems, “permitting word – word merge, word – phrase merge,
and also phrase – phrase merge.”
While human syntax is a 3-merge system, Rizzi notes that subsystems of human
language are less expressive: “for instance, one may think of the hierarchical
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structure of the syllable as arising from the operation of two such systems: a
nucleus is merged with a coda to determine a rhyme, and an onset is merged
with a rhyme, to determine a syllable, thus giving rise to hierarchically orga-
nized structures of three elements [Syllable Onset [Rhyme Nucleus Coda]]. Here, two
1-merge devices combine to give rise to expressions of three elements, but the
overall system is non-recursive, as it cannot reapply to its own output.”
The male Campbell’s root + suffix (-oo) structure is a 1-merge system, with the
constraint that -oo does not occur on its own. Diana female social calls might be
another instantiation of this system (Veselinović et al. 2014; Candiotti et al. 2012;
Coye et al. 2016). The jury is still out concerning the status of Colobus snort-roar
sequences. If they cannot be interpreted compositionally as snort + roar, the
complexity might be placed in the phonology, in the morphology or in the syntax.
More work is needed before we can come to a conclusion on this matter.
Importantly, one needs to determine where simple concatenation – inter-
preted as conjunction – should be placed in this system. Our impression,
Sauerland’s suggestion, and probably Rizzi’s own intuition, is that in our studies
concatenation should not be taken to involve a real instance of “merge”. The
reason is that each call can be treated as a separate utterance, and thus contribute
its informational content independently from the others (this was in fact our
intended interpretation for (2) when a is a time parameter). If one viewed con-
catenation-qua-conjunction as a non-trivial operation, one would presumably take
such cases to be 2-merge systems, in which a call can be merged with a sequence
of calls.
4 Semantics
4.1 Theory choice and natural classes
In Section 2.2, we tried to clear up some general confusions about semantics in
general, and formal monkey semantics in particular. But this is not to say that
the methodological situation is simple. One implicit constraint on the enterprise
is that the lexical entries we posit should be based on categories that are
reasonably natural for monkeys (a point to which we return in Section 6). As
an example, we sought to explain why Campbell’s krak is primarily used as a
leopard alarm in the Tai forest, but as a general alert on Tiwai island. We could
have, absurdly, posited the disjunctive interpretive rule in (6), which ends up
saying something like: krak has Meaning (i) if uttered in Tai, and Meaning (ii) if
uttered on Tiwai.
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(6) krak is true in situation w iff (i) there are leopards in the general environ-
ment of s, and there is a leopard in s; or (ii) there are no leopards in the
general environment of s, and there is a disturbance in s.
It is intuitively clear that there is nothing unified in this lexical entry. But the
criterion by which a lexical entry is plausible or not remains entirely implicit at
this point. A solid common sense is thus needed to avoid postulating impossibly
complex lexical entries – and opinions as to what counts as “impossibly com-
plex” might of course differ. In the long term, some constraint on possible
lexical entries would be very useful – a problem that is not unique to primate
linguistics (indeed, the same issue arises to some extent in human linguistics).
As in other areas, lexical semantics should ultimately be connected to the
conceptual repertoire of the species under investigation – hence the relevance
of animal psychology for the study of animal communication.
4.2 A null hypothesis: concatenation as conjunction
Although monkey sequences can be quite long, we take the “null hypothesis” to
be that each call contributes its informational content independently from the
others, by way of a propositional meaning. As we noted in Section 3.2, this leads
one to expect that the semantic content of a sequence should be the conjunction
of the meanings of its component parts, evaluated at their respective times of
utterance. This is the most trivial notion of “compositionality” that one can
imagine, which is not indicative of the existence of genuine rules of combination
(since each call can be interpreted independently).
This point should be borne in mind with respect to claims that some animal
systems display aspects of compositionality. For instance, in an extremely inter-
esting recent article, Engesser et al. 2016 argue that pied babbler (Turdoides
bicolor) display stronger reactions to an alert call followed by a series of recruit-
ment calls (a combination they term a “mobbing sequence”) than they do to either
of their component parts (although the reactions are of the same types), and
conclude that this communication system displays “rudimentary compositional-
ity”. But a crucial question is what one means by “rudimentary compositionality”.
If this goes beyond the null hypothesis, one would need to show that these calls
are combined by an operation different from conjunction. It is not clear that there
is evidence for this. The authors write that they “can rule out alternative explana-
tions related to a sequential or additive processing of calls, because responses to
played back mobbing sequences exceeded those elicited by the independent calls
or their sum.” But nothing in a conjunctive semantics contradicts this. To take a
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human analogy: Little Johnny is on the pedestrian crossing might not trigger a
human alarm; nor need There is a car coming be alarming when uttered on its
own. But the conjunction Little Johnny is on the pedestrian crossing and there is a
car coming might require immediate action: the effect of the conjunction is not
additive in terms of the effects of the conjuncts.
Thus when we argue that in some cases calls cannot plausibly be analyzed
as contributing a separate proposition combined conjunctively with the other
calls of the sequence, we are mindful of the fact that this is a departure from the
null hypothesis.
4.3 Can all atomic calls be treated as independent
propositions?
As mentioned above, the main cases in which some atomic elements were not
treated as propositional involved the suffix -oo and snort-roar sequences.
Sauerland 2016 correctly asks whether these too could be analyzed in proposi-
tional terms.
Let us start with -oo, comparing its behavior to that of boom. In our analysis,
the non-predation call boom can modify the meaning of other sequences that
would otherwise warn of a threat; but we still treated it as conjunctively modify-
ing the meaning of these sequences. To be concrete, consider a cross-species
version of the problem (but it arises in species-internal communication as well):
Zuberbühler 2002 showed that in the Tai forest Diana monkeys react with their
own alarm calls to Campbell’s sequences of kraks (indicative of leopards) or hoks
(indicative of eagles); but they do not react with alarm calls when exposed to the
same sequences prefixed by boom boom. Boom boom thus contributes the infor-
mation that the situation is not one of predation. To the extent that boom boom
can be followed by krak (e. g. in boom boom krak krakoo), this could be explained
in our preferred theory because the lexical meaning of these calls is relatively
weak, and gets strengthened by competition with other calls; in sequences with
booms, the strengthening may fail to arise, in which case no contradiction would
arise with the initial booms.
Could a similar logic be applied to -oo, which we treated as a propositional
modifier rather than as a proposition? Sauerland 2016 puts forth the analysis in (7):
(7) I(-oo) = there is a weak disturbance
So if hok has a meaning akin to there is a non-ground disturbance, hok-oo would
yield: there is non-ground disturbance and there is a weak disturbance. On the
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further assumption that there is only one disturbance, one would get the
inference that there is (only) a weak disturbance. Furthermore, one could even
posit that hok competes with hok-oo, and thus that its meaning gets enriched to:
there is a non-weak disturbance.
But it is worth examining the consequences of this move for our preferred
(pragmatics-based) theory of Campbell’s calls. As will be recalled, we took the
entailment relations among Campbell’s calls to be given by the following dia-
gram, where full lines connect calls in an entailment relation (with higher = logi-
cally stronger).
(8)
krak
krak-oo hok
hok-oo
Details matter, so we will quote the explanations we gave in Schlenker et al. 2014:
–Given our semantics for -oo, it immediately follows that a modified root R-oo always
entails the bare root R.
–In addition, hok – and thus also the stronger hok-oo – entails krak: if the caller is alert to
a disturbance whose source is non-terrestrial, then certainly the caller is alert to a
disturbance.
–Are there further entailments? Not if the contribution of -oo in R-oo (“... weak among
the disturbances that license R”) is understood in a natural, non-intersective way, for
instance as: “... is a disturbance in the bottom n%, in terms of threat level, among the
disturbances that license R”. In particular, without special assumptions, there is no
entailment relation between krak-oo and hok-oo. If krak-oo is used, then the caller is
alert to a disturbance that counts as weak among all general disturbances; but this need
not imply that the caller is alert to a disturbance that counts as weak among all those
whose source is non-terrestrial. For instance, if aerial disturbances usually involve
eagles, an inter-group encounter might count as a weak disturbance (e.g. in the bottom
10% of aerial threats); but this need not entail that it counts as weak among all the
disturbances there are, as many of the non-aerial disturbances might be considerably
less threatening than eagle encounters (hence an inter-group encounter might fail to be
in the bottom 10% of all threats).
Crucially, the discontinuous line in (8) does not correspond to an entailment
relation on this analysis. But it does on Sauerland’s alternative: if the combina-
tion of -oo is conjunctive, and if hok is more informative than krak, it also
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follows that hok-oo is more informative than krak-oo. This leads one to expect
that krak-oo should give rise to the implicature that hok-oo could not be used.
Hence we should get the inference that a weak threat occurred, but not a non-
ground threat – hence presumably a ground threat. But our initial observation
was that krak-oo is used as a completely general alert call, including in cases of
eagle sightings (Ouattara’s data: Ouattara et al. 2009b; Schlenker et al. 2014).
The implicature of a non-ground threat thus does not seem to arise, thereby
providing an argument within our preferred theory against analyzing -oo as an
independent sentence.
Let us turn to snort-roar sequences. We argued in Schlenker et al. 2016b
that these sequences might have to be analyzed in a non-compositional fash-
ion, although the complexity might be phonological rather than morphological
or syntactic in nature (we don’t know). Sauerland 2016 argues instead that in
all cases snorts and roars might be interpreted as simple propositional ele-
ments. He notes, reasonably, that the ordering we find, with snorts preceding
roars, might be due to articulatory constraints (although this too is a big
unknown at this point) – and if so, no bona fide syntactic constraints would
be needed. Regarding the semantics, Sauerland writes that “the initial alarm
calls are of greater importance since they trigger a specific evasive behavior,
while once an individual is engaged in evasive behavior already, it may ignore
content about a specific behavior.” He goes on to argue for the interesting
propositional analysis in (9).
(9) Sauerland’s proposed reanalysis of Black-and-White Colobus snorts
and roars
a. [[s]] = I’m currently in the alarm state & if you’re not already engaged
in evasive behavior, you should perform the evasive behavior for a
ground threat.
b. [[r]] = I’m currently in the alarm state & if you’re not already engaged
in evasive behavior, you should perform the evasive behavior for an
aerial threat.
The interest of this analysis is that each call has a general component (pertain-
ing to an alarm state), and a specific one (pertaining to a ground- vs. aerial-
related evasive behavior). But the specific component is vacuously satisfied
when the addressee is already engaged in evasive behavior. As a result, the
specific effect of a call will be only felt when it appears at the beginning of a
sequence. Still, this proposal raises several questions. First, it is not entirely
clear what is predicted when a snort-roar sequence appears at the beginning of
a discourse. Since snort-roar sequences are tight acoustic units, the specific
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component will be nearly contradictory (“engage in evasive behavior for a
ground threat and engage in evasive behavior for an aerial threat”), unless we
take the initial snort to trigger a ground-related evasive behavior before the
roars are analyzed. But this won’t account for the (relatively few) cases in
which snort-roar sequences appear at the beginning of eagle-related discourses
(see the appendices of Schlenker et al. 2016b for data). Second, one would
expect that discourse-medially, where the specific component is vacuous, pure
roar sequences should occur in comparable ways to snort-roar sequences,
including in contexts of ground threats – which should be investigated (pre-
sumably, it is on syntactic grounds that Sauerland prohibits snorts given singly
from appearing in non-discourse-initial positions – which is also the position
we took in Schlenker et al. 2016b8; but pure roar sequences clearly appear in
all positions). By contrast, we assumed in Schlenker et al. 2016b that snort-roar
sequences have a broader distribution than either of their component parts,
hence our (highly tentative) conclusion that they might have to be analyzed in
a non-compositional fashion. Finally, the lexical entries in (9) involve what are
intuitively very sophisticated concepts – which only highlights the importance
of constraints on possible lexical entries, as mentioned in Section 4.1.
Our provisional conclusions on the need for mechanisms of composition
that go beyond conjunction still stand, although the situation might of course
change as more data become available.
5 Pragmatics
One of the key innovations of Schlenker et al. 2016b is the proposal that there
should be a division of labor between semantics and pragmatics, and in parti-
cular that the meaning of a weak call S competing with a more informative call
Sʹ may be enriched with the negation of Sʹ, as stated in (10).
(10) Informativity Principle
If a sentence S was uttered and if Sʹ is (i) an alternative to S, and (ii) strictly
more informative than S (in the sense that Sʹ asymmetrically entails S),
infer that Sʹ is false.
We were careful to state the principle in a way that need not require a theory of
mind, as shown in (11).
8 We stipulated in the syntax that “if single snorts appear, they do so at the beginning of
discourses”.
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(11) Informativity Principle without a theory of mind
Assume that the semantics yields a relation “is strictlymore informative than”
on some sentences that are alternatives to each other. Underinformative
sentences are prohibited by the following rules:
Speaker: Do not utter S in a situation w if a strictly more informative alter-
native Sʹ is true in w.
Hearer: If you hear S in a situation w, infer that every strictlymore informative
alternative Sʹ is false in w.
But this proposal is sufficiently new in primate analyses that it requires detailed
justification. Further pragmatic principles we proposed are even more contro-
versial, and are in need of further support.
5.1 Arguing for Informativity
The initial motivation for the Informativity Principle was as follows. There are
numerous cases in primate communication (and beyond, probably) in which a
general call competes with a more specific one in the repertoire of a given
species. For instance, in Titi monkeys the B-call is used in predatory and non-
predatory situations alike, whereas the A-call seems to have a narrower distribu-
tion and to invite a particular behavior, namely of looking up. Similarly, in
Putty-nosed monkeys, pyows are used in all sorts of situations, including in
leopard-related ones, and also at the end of sequences triggered by eagle
stimuli, whereas hacks appear to have a narrower usage, possibly related to
non-ground threats, or possibly high arousal (several other cases are discussed
in Macedonia and Evans 1993). Now consider in both species a field experiment
involving eagle stimuli. Results are quite clear: the specific call (hack for Putty-
nosed monkeys, the A-call for Titis) is used at the beginning of the resulting
sequences. But if the competing call is genuinely general (as its distribution
indicates), why is it not used? The question is not usually raised in primatology,
probably because the implicit answer is that one would have no reason to use a
less specific call when a more specific one is available. But this is just what the
Informativity Principle in (10) states.
Steinert-Threlkeld 2016 correctly notes that several standard tests used in
human language to decide between semantic vs. pragmatic analyses of a con-
struction (notably those based on the interaction with logical operators such as
negation) are inapplicable given the limited expressive power of monkey lan-
guages. Still, several suggestive arguments can be developed. In the case of the
Informativity Principle, they are of four kinds.
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(i) First, the Informativity Principle makes it possible to eschew highly unna-
tural lexical entries. Schematically: general alert and serious aerial threat
are both specifications that might plausibly correspond to natural concepts
(as would their conjunction, presumably). By contrast, a negative specifica-
tion such as not-a-serious-aerial-threat seems less likely to correspond to a
natural concept. By making use of the Informativity Principle, we can get
the general effects of a “negative” lexical entry without actually positing
one: we define entries for general alert and also for serious aerial threat,
leaving it to the Informativity Principle to explain why the general alert call
is not usually employed in contexts of serious aerial threat.
Note that this reasoning is often made in areas of human linguistics to
motivate competition principles, for instance in morphology. For instance,
the zero ending in the English present tense is used everywhere except in
the 3rd person singular. While the zero ending could be given the speci-
fication “not-3rd-person-singular-present”, morphologists usually prefer
to note that this is not a natural class, although it is the complement of
one. A principle of competition solves the problem: the null suffix only
gets a [present] specification, -s gets the [3rd person, singular, present]
specification, and competition guarantees that -s gets inserted wherever it
can be (see for instance Bobaljik 2015). This argument is implicitly based
on what counts as a “natural morphological class”; this is the same kind
of problem we mentioned for our own analysis in Section 4.1: a semantic
analysis depends on a definition of what counts as a natural semantic
class, and ultimately on a natural concept.
(ii) Second, due to its pragmatic nature, the Informativity Principle can natu-
rally be taken to be a “soft” constraint, and thus to yield an enrichment
that is optional. This makes the prediction that general calls should have
some uses in situations that would license a more specific call. We
appealed to this property in our analysis of Campbell’s krak calls in the
Tai forest: although krak mostly has the distribution of a leopard call, we
noted that it gave rise to more “incorrect” (non-leopard-related) uses than
one would expect if this were really its lexical specification (the compar-
ison was effected by noting that non-leopard uses of krak were more
frequent than non-aerial uses of hok9). A related situation arises in
human language: John will order a burger or some fries naturally leads to
9 In our preferred (pragmatics-based) theory, hok had a lexical meaning of non-ground alert,
and gave rise to raptor-related inferences due to competition with hok-oo. But this didn’t affect
the contrast between the number of incorrect uses for krak vs. hok, since we counted kraks used
in eagle contexts vs. hoks used in leopard contexts.
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the inference that he won’t order both, but this is a defeasible inference –
unlike what would happen if we added but not both.
(iii) Third, because enrichment by the Informativity Principle is not obligatory,
we could expect it not to apply if the enrichment leads to a contradiction or
a useless meaning. We mentioned above the case of kraks preceded by
boom boom, which suddenly stop yielding a leopard-related message, at
least in the Diana monkeys’ understanding of Campbell’s calls. We made
use of a more sophisticated variant of the same principle to explain why
krak has its unadorned, general meaning on Tiwai island. By competition
with hok and krak-oo, it could obtain a meaning of serious and ground-
related threat. We argued that for lack of serious threats of a ground-related
nature on Tiwai, this would be a near-contradiction, and thus that strength-
ening should not apply. In a way, this is close to the logic used in the
analysis of a sentence such as: I’ll invite John or Mary – I’ll even invite them
both. While the first sentence could be enriched by competition with I’ll
invite John and Mary, this would yield an exclusive reading of or which is
contradicted by the second sentence, and for this reason strengthening is
taken not to apply.
(iv) Fourth, in rare cases, compositional considerations can provide an argu-
ment for a weak meaning, which must be independently enriched by the
Informativity Principle. Such was the case of the krak/krak-oo interaction
in male Campbell’s monkeys in the Tai forest: if krak had a leopard
meaning, given that hok-oo is in some way a watered-down version of
hok, one would expect that krak-oo should be a watered-down version of
krak, and should have something to do with ground threats, contrary to
fact. Giving krak a general meaning makes it possible to derive krak-oo
from the very general meaning of krak, which in turns accounts for the
highly general uses of krak-oo. The Informativity Principle is then in
charge of explaining why krak on its own still has leopard-related mean-
ings in that environment.
Seyfarth and Cheney 2016 correctly suggest that the Informativity Principle
should be subjected to specific field experiments – definitely an important
direction to explore. But it must be noted that extant field experiments in
which an eagle call appears at the beginning of an eagle-triggered sequence
despite the availability of a more general call already make the point. In addi-
tion, one could consider entirely different experiments designed to test the
existence of the Informativity Principle in call acquisition. Thus Takashi Morita
(p.c.) suggested that in artificial learning experiments, one could expose pri-
mates or other animals to two labels L and Lʹ and a learning environment in
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which Lʹ is true in a strict subset of the situations in which L is true (so that Lʹ is
strictly stronger than L). One could then test whether Lʹ blocks L when both are
applicable, be it in comprehension or (if testable) in production. This would of
course take us in a very different direction from field experiments.
5.2 The Urgency Principle
Besides the Informativity Principle, which we used in all of our monkey studies,
we posited a (rather tentative) Urgency Principle in order to account for Putty-
nosed pyow-hack sequences:
(12) Urgency Principle
If a sentence S is triggered by a threat and contains calls that convey
information about its nature or location, no call that conveys such infor-
mation should be preceded by any call that doesn’t.
The basic idea was that pyow has a meaning of general alert and that hack has a
meaning of serious non-ground movement-related alert, with the result that the
conjunction of pyows and hacks is rather underspecified. In particular, it could
be used in situations of group movement (because Putty-nosed monkeys are
arboreal), and also in eagle-related situations. But in the latter case, hacks
would provide information about the location of a threat, and should thus
come before pyows, which don’t convey such information. This provides a
mechanism of pragmatic enrichment of the meaning of pyow-hack sequences,
using something other than the Informativity Principle.
Since at this point pyow-hack sequences are the only domain of application
of the Urgency Principle, the latter should be seen as stipulative. But it is
interesting to note that it might have applications beyond the primate realm.
In recent work on the Japanese great tit (Parus minor), Suzuki et al. 2016 noted
that on its own a sequence of notes ABC induces the hearer to scan for danger,
while a sequences of D notes induces it to approach the caller. ABC-D combina-
tions (in that order) have a mixed effect: hearers approach the caller and also
scan (not necessarily in that order). But crucially, when the order of the notes is
artificially reversed, leading to the sequence D-ABC, hearers rarely scan and
approach. Although the authors speak of a “compositional syntax”, they them-
selves hint at a pragmatic analysis of their results:
As D notes are often produced in non-predator contexts, conspecifics hearing D notes before
ABC notes may be slower to produce appropriate anti-predator behaviours, which may be of
particular importance when tits are defending their nestlings. (Suzuki et al. 2016: 5)
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Such considerations might argue for a bird application of (a version of) the
Urgency Principle: the D sequence doesn’t provide information about the pre-
sence of a danger, but the ABC sequence does. Urgency would thus lead one to
expect that when the two sequences are put together, the ABC sequence should
come first. When this principle is violated, responses are clearly weakened.
Similar remarks might be helpful to understand why in the data discussed by
Engesser et al. 2016 (see above) alert calls seemed to always come before
recruitment calls.
It remains to be seen, of course, whether independent evidence will be
found for the Urgency Principle, within Putty-nosed monkeys and beyond.10
5.3 Occam’s Razor
Putting together our semantic and pragmatic principles leads to a relatively
powerful system. Hence the question whether it’s not too powerful arises.
Jäger 2016 does not find issue with our semantic analyses, but casts doubt on
some of our pragmatic explanations on the ground that they are insufficiently
parsimonious (and as he notes (p.c.), the problem we mentioned in Section 4.1
only compounds the problem). In particular, he observes that besides simple
lexical entries for pyow and hack, our theory of Putty-nosed pyow-hack
sequences “have to be complemented by quite a few additional principles and
assumptions:
1. the Urgency Principle (44),
2. the (revised) Informativity Principle (35),
3. the assumption of Alarm decay (41), and
10 Steinert-Threlkeld makes a friendly (and correct) amendment to our analysis of Putty-nosed
syntax in connection to the Urgency Principle (our analysis is developed along similar lines, but
in greater detail, in Schlenker et al. 2016a). As he writes, Schlenker et al. 2016b “posit H+P+
sentences as part of the syntax even though they appear never to be used. They claim that they
need to do so because ‘sentences of type H+P+ … serve as alternatives to P+H+ when the
Urgency Principle is applied to the latter’. This, however, appears to be an unnecessary motiva-
tion. By the definition of alternatives in (14), the sentence Hn will be an alternative to PkHn-k since
it arises by replacing k Ps with k Hs. But PkHn-k will still be in violation of Urgency for the same
reasons as given above and so will not be used in eagle contexts. A simpler theory that does not
posit H+P+ in the syntax appears to be easily given.” The point is correct, but it raises an issue:
should it be possible for the alternatives (or the alternatives accessed by pragmatic principles) to
be ill-formed? This seems to go against the spirit of a pragmatic principle, which compares what
was said to what could have been said. But for lack of a provision to this effect (except in our
Colobus analysis, see Schlenker et al. 2016b, (58)), Steinert-Threlkeld’s point stands (see Schlenker
2008 for related discussions in human pragmatics).
194 Philippe Schlenker et al.
Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/11/16 9:27 AM
4. the piece of world knowledge given at the end of (46): ‘The most common
situations in which there is a serious non-ground-movement-related alert
but not one which is due to a threat involve group movement.’”
Jäger’s doubts are legitimate, but he commits one fallacy: the complexity of a
theory should be assessed relative to the totality of the data it seeks to explain.
And the advantage of the comparative approach we advocate is that the same
principles can be applied to several data sets. The Informativity Principle played
an important role in all of our analyses. Alarm Decay is just the claim that the
seriousness of an alarm usually decays over time, and versions of it were used in
some of our Putty-nosed, Titi and Colobus analyses, in particular when
sequences start with a specific call and end with a general call. This leaves
the Urgency Principle, discussed above, which we have seen is possibly applic-
able to Suzuki’s (as well as Engesser’s) birds; and the environmental assumption
about the types of alerts that one could expect to find given Putty-nosed monkey
environmental conditions.
This is not to say that one cannot cast doubt on this combination of
principles – in our various studies we have usually remained very cautious
about the analyses under consideration, with the firm belief that theories are
bound to change rather radically as more data become available. But the
parsimony of a theory should be assessed correctly – that is to say, relative to
all of the data it is responsible for. (In addition, when the empirical database is
relatively limited, it is inevitable that one should come up with principles to be
tested in future research.)
6 Evolution
6.1 Evolutionary data
Research on human language evolution is notoriously difficult and speculative.
The heart of the matter is that language leaves no direct archeological traces
(unlike bones and tools, for instance); and that all our closest relatives
(Neanderthals, Denisovans, etc.) disappeared long ago without telling us what
kind of language abilities they had, if any. In the latter respect, the situation is
considerably more favorable in monkey languages: as we discussed in connec-
tion with cercopithecines, plotting the distribution of boom calls in a phyloge-
netic tree (from Guschanski et al. 2013) suggests that booms are at least several
million years old in quite a few species. Similar evolutionary inferences could be
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drawn on several other calls, including Putty-nosed and Blue monkey pyows and
hacks/kas. One key issue for the future will be to investigate these evolutionary
questions in an empirically detailed fashion, and to connect them with models
of meaning evolution developed in the literature.
6.2 Evolutionary scenarios
The approach we advocate in Schlenker et al. 2016b should be extended with
precise formal analyses of the evolutionary scenarios that might have led to the
meanings we posit (see Franke and Wagner 2014).
6.2.1 One call
We focused on relatively rich monkey repertoires, as these make methods from
“formal monkey linguistics” more useful than in more trivial systems. But to
analyze animal language evolution, it might be good to start with a species that
uses a single call, say A. In this case, a detailed analysis of the utility obtained
by the speaker and hearer when they follow certain strategies should in princi-
ple make it possible to predict (using game-theoretic tools) the final meaning of
A. For instance, the speaker may call whenever there is a cat, whenever there is
a raptor, or whenever there is a raptor or a cat. The hearer may have a strategy of
looking up, or looking down, or of scanning, whenever it hears the A-call. A
detailed analysis of the pay-offs should yield precise predictions.
6.2.2 Several calls
When systems with a single call are understood, systems with several calls may
be analyzed with similar methods. But multi-call systems raise the general issue
of competition among calls, as we discussed above (see Skyrms 2010 for relevant
discussion of systems in which there are fewer calls than actions to be taken).
Jäger 2016 notes, reasonably, that the Informativity Principle currently lacks any
support from models of language evolution. In fact, to our knowledge the
question has never been asked, so we take Jäger’s point to be an excellent
issue for future research: Can the development of the Informativity Principle
be studied within current models of meaning evolution?
Still, we agree with Jäger that several theoretical objections can be raised at
the outset when the problem is viewed from an evolutionary perspective. We
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start with Jäger’s general objection, and state more specific objections that could
be leveled as well.
Objection 1: As Jäger 2016 writes, in evolutionary models “meanings are concep-
tualized as actions of the receiver which induce different fitness values for both
sender and receiver. So they correspond to ‘interpretations’ rather than ‘meanings’
if we draw a distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Abstract meanings,
however, being abstract, are not directly relevant for fitness. This begs the question
how they – and therefore the distinction between semantics and pragmatics – could
have evolved in the first place in connection with innate signaling systems.”
Reply: Certainly the effects of meanings – and in particular the different fitness
values they give rise to – should be assessed in terms of actions they trigger. But
from this it does not follow that meanings are cognitively represented in terms of
actions (this might not always be cognitively possible if the actions involved are
disjunctive or complex; and constraints on communication, involving for
instance context dependency and multiple receivers, might also favor a less
direct relation between signals and actions). So the net fitness effect of the
meanings we posit together with the associated pragmatic principles will be
evaluated in terms of actions; but this does not preclude the kind of modular
approach we favor – at least if some evolutionary scenarios can explain how the
various modules could have developed.
Objection 2. The Informativity Principle only has some “bite” to the extent that
one signal is strictly stronger than another. But on evolutionary grounds this
scenario is unlikely to be stable in the first place.
To make things concrete, consider the case of A- and B-calls in Titi monkeys.
According to our analysis, B is a general call, A is a “serious non-ground threat”
call. So when the A-call can be used, the B-call can be used as well. But consider the
pay-offs associated with the specific vs. the general information. It is highly likely
that the specific information allows the receiver to obtain a higher pay-off, namely
by adopting a raptor-appropriate escape strategy. Now consider the semantic
associations in (13) (for simplicity we write “raptor” in lieu of “serious non-ground
danger” in order to simplify the discussion, but nothing hinges on this).
(13) a. Meaning 1: A → raptor B → danger
b. Meaning 2: A → raptor B → danger, non-raptor
A sender adhering to Meaning 1 would use A in a proportion (1-ε) of raptor
situations, but also B in the remaining proportion ε of these raptor situations.
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This leads to a dilemma. (i) If ε=0, the receiver strategy can be improved by
always interpreting B as “danger, non-raptor”. This means that in the end the
sender and receiver are using Meaning 2, not Meaning 1. (ii) If ε ≠ 0, a mutant
sender strategy that only uses A in raptor situations will presumably produce
greater utility and thus come to replace the initial strategy (on the assumption
that information exchange is cooperative). This will bring us back to case (i),
and Meaning 2 will replace Meaning 1.
Reply: A possible rejoinder is that this analysis assumes that all meanings are
equally available. But the intuition behind our initial argument for the Informativity
Principle is that certain meanings do not correspond to natural classes – notably,
“non-raptor” in the case at hand just might not be a cognitively available meaning
(and more strikingly, in our “real” analysis, the meaning corresponding to the
negative concept “non-[serious non-ground threat]” might not be available in the
first place). From this perspective, the Informativity Principle might be the onlyway
to approximate the non-raptor meaning, which in turn might provide the beginning
of an explanation for the emergence of the Informativity Principle.
Objection 3. A second possible objection is that what appears to be a general,
underspecified meaning corresponds in fact to a highly specific action, namely
of the kind that is appropriate for cases of ground predators as well as of general
uncertainty about the nature of a threat. On this analysis, then, we should re-
conceptualize the underspecified nature of the B-call as a highly specific action-
tied meaning, something like:
A → pay attention to a high danger
B → scan the environment
Reply: This alternative should be investigated.11 But it should be noted that its
predictions might be different from those of Schlenker et al. 2016b. In particular,
the alternative would seem to predict constant responses to what we took to be
general calls.12 By contrast, the theories we propose predict that, when the general
meaning is not strengthened by competition with other calls, reactions might be
11 Note that this alternative theory replaces the mechanism of competition among calls with a
mechanism on which the more specific reaction – paying attention to a high danger – blocks
the less specific reaction – scanning the environment.
12 One could imagine calls that provide information about disjunctive actions (“look up or look
down”), but if one call provides more specific action-related information than another, we will
be back to the problem we discussed in Objection 2.
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diverse and context-dependent (because the information conveyed by the call is
unspecific). More research should consider these alternatives, both on an empirical
level (to determine what the facts are) and on a theoretical level (to determine
under what conditions underspecified calls can emerge – for instance in case the
sender cannot directly provide information about the receiver’s optimal reaction,
either for lack of information or because there are several receivers).
These remarks only scratch the surface of this part of the debate. Two things
should be clear. First, our analyses should be embedded within precise formal
analyses of the evolution of monkey meanings. Second, the latter could be
greatly enriched by taking into account the three-pronged strategy advocated
in our work, which has a formal, a typological and an evolutionary component.
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